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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE ALBERT HORNE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9380 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from the verdict of the jury, 
in the above entitled matter finding him guilty of 
the crime of rape, from the ruling of the court de-
nying defendant's motion for a new trial, and from 
the sentence of the court to the Utah State Prison. 
The record on appeal is in two volumes, one 
of which consists of the pleadings, minute entries 
and similar papers. All references to this volume 
'are designated by the letter "R." The other volume 
which is separately numbered, is a transcript of 
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the testimony and proceedings at the trial. Refer-
ences to this volume are designated by the letter "T." 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shirley Pies, the prosecutrix, was a married 
wom~an, twenty years of age, at the time of the 
trial. (T. 7) Her husband, ~a member of the armed 
forces, was at all times mentioned herein stationed 
overseas. She lived alone with their two children in 
a trailer, located in Hammond's Trailer Court, Clear-
field, Utah. (T. 7, 31, 32) The defendant, twenty-
two years old, resided with his parents in their home 
which was but one hundred yards from the trailer 
housing Mrs. Pies. ( T. 65) 
The prosecutrix and the defendant had several 
mutual friends, and were well acquainted with each 
other, h·aving met on sundry occasions in various 
bars and clubs. (T. 17, 65) He had been in her trail-
er on times prior to the night in question, including 
the next preceding night at approxim'ately the same 
hour. (T. 6'5, 71) 
The prosecutrix testified that she retired about 
10:30 o'clock p.m. on the night of June 14, 1960, 
placing her two-year old daughter in bed with her, 
and her three-year old son in another bed just off 
the hallway. (T. 8) The night being warm, she left 
both outside doors to the trailer open; the screen 
doors were unlatched. (T. 18, 19) Shortly after 
midnight she awakened when the doorbell rang. (T. 
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8) She asked who was there, and recognized the 
voice of the defendant when he replied that it was 
he. (T. 9) He entered the trailer through the front 
door, went into the kitchen looking for a coke, and 
then into the bedroom where he found the prose-
cutrix still in bed, clothed only in a h·alf-slip and a 
pair of pan ties. ( T. 9, 10) From this point on, the 
testimony of the principals is somewh'at contradic-
tory. 
When the defendant asked the prosecutrix per-
mission to make love to her she refused, fearing she 
might become pregnant and afraid of what the de-
fendant's girl friend would do if she learned of it. 
(T. 72) The defendant maintained that upon enter-
ing the bedroom he sat down on the edge of the bed 
next to the prosecutrix. (T. 66) For a time they 
talked, though the conversation quickly led to neck-
ing, laughing and giggling; both were soon lying 
across the bed. (T. 66, 67) 
Approximately half an hour later the prosecu-
trix got up to go to the bathroom. (T. 11) Enroute 
she passed by the open rear door of the trailer. (T. 
23) While she was in the bathroom, the defendant, 
undressed, smoked a cigarette, and then went to the 
door of the bathroom to meet her. (T. 68) She 
cl'aimed he thereupon grabbed her ·and pulled her 
back to the bed; (T. 11) he said that he took her 
hand; she led him. (T. 68) The prosecutrix testi-
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fied, somewhat vaguely, of a struggle which ceased 
only upon her becoming "so tired," and being held 
in such a manner that she could no longer prevent 
the act of intercourse. (T. 11, 12) The defendant 
admitted that she warned him she might become 
pregnant, :and therefore took precautionary mea-
sures. (T. 70, 72) They then had intercourse, satis-
fying their mutual desires. (T. 69) Both principals 
testified that the defendant was in the trailer for 
more th·an three hours, almost all of which time was 
spent in bed with the prosecutrix. ('T. 22, 70) Their 
final session lasted from 1 :30 a.m. until nearly 4:00 
a.m., two ~and one-half hours! (T. ·2'2) 
The evidence shows that the trailers in this 
park were in close proximity with each other, and 
that the Newell trailer was but twenty feet from 
the trailer wherein the alleged assault took place. 
( T. 60) Even though the doors were open, due to 
the warm night, and other trailers were close at 
hand, the prosecutrix failed to make any outcry. 
(T. 60) 
After their love-making was over, the defendant 
dressed and they went into the livingroom, smoked 
a cigarette and talked for ·a few minutes; (T. 69) 
after the defendant left, the prosecutrix returned 
to bed. (T. 13) The defendant arose later that morn-
ing, worked all day, and went to a movie that night, 
only to return home and find law enforcement of-
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ficers awaiting his arrival (T. 70) in response to 
the complaint of the prosecutrix made at 7:00 p.m. 
that night, (T. 30, 39) more than fifteen hours 
after the alleged rape! 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION, AND THAT THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT AND 
SENTENCE ·OF THE COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT COMPETENT CORROBOR-
ATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTRIX; 
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO PROVE, BEYOND 
ALL REASONABLE DOUBT, THE FORCIBLE RAPE 
OF THE PROSECUTRIX BY THE ACCUSED. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON THE REQUISITE EXTENT OF PENE-
TRATION NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE SEXUAL 
INTERCOURSE IN A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE, 
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED THAT AN 
ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN CON-
SUMMATED. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE FEMALE 
PERSON NEED ONLY BE SUCH AS TO MAKE NON-
CONSENT AND ACTUAL RESISTANCE REASON-
ABLY MANIFEST. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK 
RECITING PARTICULARS AND DETAILS OF THE 
ALLEGED OFFENSE AS RELATED TO HER BY THE 
PROSECUTRIX WAS HEARSAY AND INADMISSIBLE, 
AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
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POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT VI. 
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE CU-
MULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN C'ONNECTION 




THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION, AND THAT THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY AND THE JUDGMENT AND 
SENTENCE ~oF THE COURT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE 
BECAUSE THERE IS NOT COMPETENT CORROBOR-
ATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTRIX; 
THAT THE EVIDENCE FAILS TO PROVE, BEYOND 
ALL REASONABLE D·OUBT, THE FORCIBLE RAPE 
OF THE PROSECUTRIX BY THE ACCUSED. 
A charge of rape is one easily made but diffi-
cult to defend. Inasmuch as such an asS'ault would 
rarely take place in the presence of witnesses, the 
jury generally has only the testimony of the prosecu-
trix and the defendant upon which to base its con-
sideration of the accusation. The appell'ate courts 
have therefore closely scrutinized the testimony of 
the princip·als in an effort to make certain that the 
conviction is supported by evidence not incredible 
or unsubstantial: 
"Nevertheless, we cannot escape the re-
sponsibility of passing judgment upon wheth-
er under the evidence a jury could, in reason, 
conclude that the defendant's guilt was proved 
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beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Willia~, 
111 Utah 379, 180 P. 2d 551. 
"We reverse a jury verdict only where 
we conclude from a consideration of all of the 
evidence and the inferences therefrom viewed 
in the light most favorable to such verdict 
that the findings are unreasonable. In con-
sidering this question we must keep in mind 
that this is a criminal prosecution, so the evi-
dence must be sufficient to support a finding 
that all reason·able doubt in favor of the de-
fendant has been eliminated. A mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence, or a finding that 
guilt is more probable than innocence, is not 
sufficient." State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 
208, 357 P. 2d 183. 
Where the claims of the prosecutrix are uncorrobor-
'ated, the survey of the appellate tribunal is even 
more carefully conducted: 
"While it is the law ... that a conviction 
of rape may be sustained upon the uncorrobor-
ated testimony of the outraged female, it is 
nevertheless equally well settled that the ap-
pellate court will closely scrutinize the testi-
mony upon which the conviction was obtained, 
and, if it appears incredible and too unsub-
stantial to make it the basis of a judgment, it 
will reverse the judgment." State v. Goodale, 
210 Mo. 275, 109 S.W. 9. 
Thus, as in the instant situation, when the prosecu-
trix' statements are uncorroborated, such must be 
clear and convincing, 'and where they bear upon 
their face inherent evidence of improbability, are 
contradictory, inconsistant or unreasonable, they 
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will be held as insufficient, and under these cir-
cumstances must be corroborated to the extent of 
m·aking them sufficient. State v. Whittinghill, 109 
Utah 48, 163 P. 2d 342; DeWitt v. State, 79 Okla. 
Cr. 13'6, 15'2 P. 2d 284; People v. Silva, 405 Ill. 158, 
89 N. E. 2d 800. 
This court has gone even one step further in 
holding that where the uncorroborated testimony 
of the prosecutrix is improbable, contradictory, in-
consistant, or unreasonable, a presumption of falsity 
. 
ar1ses: 
" (I) f she conce'aled the injury for any 
considerable length of time ·after she had op-
portunity to complain; if she be of evil fame, 
'and stand uncorroborated by others; if she 
give false and contradictory statements as to 
the occurrence ; if the place where the act was 
alleged to have been committed was where it 
was possible she might have been heard, and 
she made no outcry; if she did not show signs 
of injury, but remained on friendly terms with 
the 'assailant after the assault, ... these and 
like circumstances carry a strong presump-
tion that her testimony is false or feigned." 
State v. Halford, 17 Utah 475, 54 P. 819. 
This reasoning arises mainly from the fact that 
the essential guilt of the crime of rape consists, not 
in the act of intercourse itself, but in the outrage 
to the person 'and feeling of the female. Section 
76-53-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; State v. Mc-
Cune, 16 Utah 170, 51 P. 818. Thus, unless the evi-
dence conforms to this statutory requirement, there 
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can be no conviction of the accused for the crime 
of rape, even though an act of intercourse took place 
between the principals. The existance of this element 
of outrage is portrayed by the acts ·and ommissions 
of the prosecutrix during ·and following the alleged 
assault. It is submitted that the evidence adduced 
in the instant situation demonstrated that though 
the complaining witness was at first unwilling, she 
consented to having intercourse with the defend!ant, 
made no substantial effort to resist, and suffered 
no outrage to her feelings until nearly twenty-four 
hours later when she called the police and made 
her complaint. 
When such an outrage is committed, it is the 
natural instinct of a woman's nature to promptly 
m·ake the wrong known, and to seek assurance and 
symp~athy and legal retribution. The prosecutrix in 
this case showed no such instinct until the next 
evening when she then contacted law enforcement 
officers and made formal complaint. (T. 30, 39) 
In Commonwe~alth v. Berklowitz, 133 Pa. S. 190, 2 
A. 2d 516, five days elapsed before the prosecutrix 
made official complaint, causing the court to in-
struct the jury to carefully scrutinize her testimony 
in deciding whether she consented, because of the 
lapse of time. In State v. Black, 204 So. Car. 414, 29 
S. E. 2d 675, the woman wrote to her mother the 
day of the assault, but failed to inform her husband 
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or an official agency, the court therefore reversing 
the conviction. In People v. Blanch, 309 Ill. 426, 141 
N. E. 146, the prosecutrix failed to inform the police 
for more than a month, though she told her sister-
in-law the very night the assault took place. The 
court held that in scrutinizing her testimony, they 
were uncertain as to defendant's guilt because of 
her failure to make prompt complaint, and reversed 
the conviction. 
Even greater aspersions are cast upon the credi-
bility of her testimony when examining her actions 
during the period of the alleged assault. She ~admitted 
when going to the bathroom prior to their act of 
sexual intercourse, she passed right by the open 
screen door, and h·ad the opportunity to run out and 
go to one of the neighboring trailers to seek aid 
and assistance. (T. 23) Having no doubt by that 
time ~as to what the intentions of the defendant were, 
(T. 22) she failed to make any attempt to escape, 
though the opportunity was there. Further, she ad-
mitted that she made no effort to turn the lights of 
the bedroom on, though the switch was handy, being 
just above her head, preferring to remain in the 
dark with the defendant. (T. 21) 
Since this was ~a warm summer night, the prose-
cutrix h~ad left both doors to the trailer open and 
unlocked. (T. 18, 19) Because of the close proximity 
of ·adjoining trailers (T. 60) had the prosecutrix 
10 
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made an outcry, there was a good chance that the 
same would have been heard, and that help could 
have been obtained. No outcry was made. She made 
no attempt to wake her son, who was asleep in the 
adjoining nook, (T. 2'5) nor did the sounds of the 
struggle and her resistance awake him. (T. '26) Her 
daughter, in bed with her, was awake earlier, but 
was not bothered nor did she cry out during any of 
the time in which her mother was allegedly being 
violated. To the observer it is odd indeed that in 
her intense objection to having intercourse with the 
defendant, the prosecutrix did none of the things 
normally resorted to by a female defending her 
honor and virtue. 
Further, her testimony was contradictory. She 
said that she went to a Dr. Bitner at the Tlanner 
Clinic the morning ~after the alleged assault for a 
medical examination. (T. 15) On cross examination 
she said the doctor she visited at the Tanner Clinic 
was a Dr. Cutler. (T. 31) Whatever his name, the 
doctor was not called as a witness to verify her testi-
mony. She did not complain of any wounds, bruises 
or other marks. Her physical condition seemed to 
be unharmed. 
Her failure to escape, the unexplained absence 
of any outcry, the delay in making formal complaint, 
and the lack of evidence of physical abuse, completely 
alter the tenor of her story and minimize the credi-
bility of her claim: 
11 
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"Unexplained f'ailure to make outcry and 
delay in making complaint tend to show con-
sent. The absence of visible injury to the prose-
cutrix by her alleged assailant or the spoiling 
or disarray of her garments are of probative 
value." Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 
N. W. 536, 7 Ann. Cas. 258. See also: Terry 
v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 540, 266 S. W. 511; 
Stewart v. State, 25 Ala. App. 266, 145 So. 
1'62; State v. Caldwell, 212 No. Car. 484, 19'3 
S. E. 716; People v. Schiro, 361 Ill. 117, 197 
N. E. 535. 
"Again, as bearing on the question of con-
sent, is whether the person assaulted called for 
help or made other outcry, especially where 
help may reasonably be expected ... (C)on-
sider carefully ... the place where the alleged 
assault took place, the proximity of persons 
.... calls for help or other outcry ... and that 
she made prompt complaint to her husband 
and to the police." State v. Dill, 42 Del. 533, 
40 A. 2d 443. 
"Upon a charge of rape, if consent ap-
pears, however reluctant it may be, there can 
be no conviction, and consent may sometimes 
be inferred if there has been no outcry and 
no serious resistance." State v. Marable, 4 
Wash. 2d 367, 103 P. 2d 1082. See also: State 
v. Cobb, 359 Mo. 373, 221 S.W. 2d 745. 
The conviction is even more incredible in that 
she admitted being unfaithful to her husband, (T. 
82, 34) and in light of testimony of her prior un-
chastity. (T. 57) It becomes quite evident that the 
situation now under examination was nothing more 
12 
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than one where the prosecutrix, though at first un-
willing to have intercourse with the accused because 
of her fear of a pregnancy, did not resist nor object 
to the act ultimately. The Wisconsin court reversed 
a conviction in a parallel situation where there was 
evidence of prior unchastity of the female, and where 
the defendant admitted intercourse: 
"The court has carefully reviewed the 
record in this case and is of the opinion that 
the complaining witness failed to make any-
thing approaching the utmost resistance re-
quired by the law, and that although some-
what unwilling, she ultimately consented to 
the acts in question, her unwillingness appar-
ently being due to her fear of becoming preg-
nant rather than to any resentment about the 
manner in which she was being treated. Al-
though she claimed she was thrown down, 
dragged and pulled under a wire fence, there 
were no marks either upon her person or cloth-
ing which indicated any such treatment. Her 
story is not only uncorroborated but improb-
able." Kaczmarzyk v. State, 228 Wis. 247, 280 
N. W. 362. See also: Diavis v. State, 152 Ga. 
320, 110 S.E. 18. 
The friendship and intimacy of the principals 
further negates the guilt of the accused. The com-
plaining witness asserted that her reason for not 
wanting the defendant in her trailer was because 
of her friendship with another woman with whom 
the defendant was also friendly. (T. 72) Though 
she was clothed only in a half-slip and a pair of 
panties, she made no effort to get out of bed, or 
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cover up when the defendant entered her bedroom. 
(T. 9) They talked for a time on the bed, and then 
began to neck and make love. (T. 66) She went 
to the bathroom, again without any effort to put on 
proper clothing, seemingly unaware of her lack of 
dress ·and completely unconcerned. (T. 2'3) Upon 
her return from the bathroom, they got in bed and 
spent two and one-half hours in each others arms. 
(T. 22) The defendant testified of having been in 
her trailer before, ·and both parties admitted prior 
friendship. ( T. 17, 615) She showed a complete lack 
of fear, and no serious objection. To spend two and 
one-half hours in 'bed with one who has just raped 
her does not seem to be natural. These factual con-
ditions wholly square with an Illinois case wherein 
the court reversed the conviction because of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence : 
"She testified that he without any invita-
tion came to her room dressed in his pajamas 
and a bathrobe. He told her he was lonesome, 
but that she told him she did not want to talk 
with him for fear of trouble with 'another wo-
man with whom the evidence shows defendant 
was on friendly terms; that he had liquor, 
which he drank, but that she refused it, as she 
did not drink hard liquor; that the talked for 
awhile on matters of politics and the like." 
People v. Serrielle, 354 Ill. 182, 188 N.E. 375. 
The conduct of both parties after the alleged 
assault further distracts from the prosecutrix' claim. 
The evidence shows that after they left the bedroom 
14 
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they went to the livingroom where they talked and 
smoked a cigarette prior to defendant's leaving the 
trailer. (T. 69) After he left, she returned to bed. 
(T. 13) The next morning he arose at his usual 
time, went to work, worked throughout the day, 
went to a movie that night with a girl friend. (T. 
70) He freely admitted that they had intercourse, 
just as he vehemently denied that it was accomplished 
with force and without her consent. These are not 
the actions of a woman who has been violated, or a 
man who has committed a grievous crime. State v. 
C~ttrone, 8. N.J. Super. 106, 73 A. 2d 354. 
The prosecutrix' description of her resistance 
to the advances of the defendant is somewh~at vague, 
and without detail. She summed it up as a "strug-
gle," followed by her being "pinned" in such a man-
ner as she was unable to move or to resist any longer. 
(T. 11, 12) Her claim of resistance becomes some-
what doubtful in considering her failure to cry out 
for help, or to escape when she got up off the bed 
and passed by the open rear door enroute to the 
bathroom, or the lack of evidence describing marks 
or bruises resulting from their wrestle. Her testi-
mony makes a feigned and passive resistance and is 
insufficient to make a case of rape by force: 
"The prosecutrix gives as her chief reason 
for yielding to defendant that she was ~afraid 
not to. At the same time, she makes it clear 
that he made no threats. He gave her to under-
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stand that he was making none. She said she 
did kick and holler when he pushed her against 
the truck, but there is no evidence in the re-
cord of 'any struggle between them other than 
this. It is clear she could have escaped from 
the truck while he was walking around from 
the left to the right side of it. She made no 
effort to do so. There was no tearing of the 
clothing nor bruises or marks of violence on 
her body. There is no evidence of scratches 
or bruises, or other indications of a resistance, 
found on defendant. Her testimony makes a 
feigned and p'assive resistance which, in the 
absence of other circumstances, is insuffi-
cient to make a case of rape by force. 'Al-
though some force be used, yet if she does not 
put forth all the power of resistance which 
she was capable of exerting under the cir-
cumstances it will not be rape.' " Killings-
worth v. State, 154 Tex. Cr. R. 223, 226 S.W. 
2d 456, citing Perez v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 
34, 94 s.w. 1036. 
In both the cited cases, convictions were reversed. 
The doctrine that one m'ay be convicted of rape 
on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix 
is well founded. But just as well settled as the rule 
itself is the exception, that where her testimony is 
contradictory, uncertain or improbable, her testi-
mony should then be corroboratedo This corroboration 
should be of such dignity as to give it weight with 
the jury upon the question that the actual crime 
has been committed. It should not be such slight 
circumstances as to leave the court 'and jury to guess 
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o1· speculate that the crime has been committed and 
that the defendant is guilty. It is apparent that the 
testimony of the prosecutrix here is uncertain and 
improbable, and that throughout her testimony it 
is made obvious th~at her acts and failures to act 
wholly contradict the legal basis for a conviction of 
the defendant of the crime of rape. Her testimony 
stands uncorroborated. The evidence completely fails 
to sustain the conviction; the verdict of the jury 
and the judgment and sentence of the court should 
be set aside because of the lack of corroboration of 
the prosecutrix' testimony. It has not been proven, 
beyond ~an reasonable doubt, that Shirley Pies was 
forcibly raped by Larry Horne. 
POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY ON THE REQUISITE EXTENT OF PENE-
TRATION NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE SEXUAL 
INTERCOURSE IN A PROSECUTION FOR RAPE, 
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADMITTED THAT AN 
ACT OF SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN CON-
SUMl\IA TED. 
The jury was instructed by the court that 
'' (A) ny sexual penetration, however slight, is suf-
ficient to constitute the act of sexual intercourse as 
that term is used with reference to the crime of 
rape." (R. 12) The instruction was given over the 
objection of counsel, (T. 85) that defendant had ad-
mitted during the course of his direct examination 
that an act of sexual intercourse took place on the 
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night in question between he and the prosecutrix. 
(T. 69) 
This court has repeatedly stated that an instruc-
tion, although it sets forth a correct legal proposition, 
not based upon or applicable to the issues raised by 
the pleadings and the evidence, is erroneous and 
prejudicial: 
"It is familiar doctrine that it is erron-
eous to give instructions based on a state of 
facts of which there is no evidence tending 
to prove, though such instructions abstractly 
contain correct statements of the law." State 
v. Marasco, 81 Utah 325, 17 P. 2d 919. See 
also: State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 P. 518; 
State v. Siddoway, 61 Utah 189, 211 P. 968. 
In the cited case which was a prosecution for 
arson, the court's instruction to the jury predicated, 
in part, conviction on finding that the accused had 
". . . aided, counseled, and procured said burning" 
of the building, even though such a proposition was 
totally unsupported by the pleadings or evidence. 
The instruction was held erroneous and prejudicial, 
the conviction reversed, the case remanded for a 
new trial. 
In the instant case the pleadings and evidence 
gave rise to no issue of whether or not an act of 
sexual intercourse took place. Both the prosecutrix 
and the defendant admitted the same, and the jury 
was under no responsibility to make any determina-
tion on this subject. The purpose of the instruction 
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is not clear. If the instruction meant to treat it as 
evidence, it violated the rule of singling out a par-
ticular piece of evidence. If the instruction aimed to 
tt·eat the acts as one of the unlawful events upon 
which the information was drawn, and the action 
predicated, it failed because of the lack of ~any fac-
tual issue to which it pertained. In either event there 
was no basis to support the court's instruction, and 
the giving of such was erroneous and prejudicial to 
the accused, improperly appealing to the sympathies 
and prejudices of the jury. Wolf v. United States, 
259 F. 388. The essential guilt of rape is not the 
act of intercourse itself, but the outrage to the person 
and feeling of the female. Section 76-53-17, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY THAT THE CONDUCT OF THE FEMALE 
PERSON NEED ONLY BE SUCH AS TO MAKE NON-
CONSENT AND ACTUAL RESISTANCE REASON-
ABLY MANIFEST. 
The jury was instructed by the court that "The 
conduct of the female person need only be such as 
to make non-consent and actu~al resistance reason-
ably manifest" in order to convict the defendant of 
the crime charged. (R. 13) This instruction closely 
contrasts a similar instruction given by a trial court 
to a jury in a case wherein the defendant was also 
charged with the crime of rape. The jury there be-
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came so confused as to the extent and meaning of 
resistance that they wholly failed to comprehend 
the import of the defense, and the requirements of 
the law. State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 
397. 
It is widely held that the State, in a prosecu-
tion for rape, must establish beyond reasonable 
doubt that utmost reluctance 'and resistance on the 
part of the female was exhibited. State v. Whitting-
hill, supra; State v. McCune, supra. The cited cases 
do not stand for the proposition that the utmost re-
sistance be shown, but utmost reluctance and resist-
ance. Where there is no evidence of threats, it is 
incumbant upon the court to instruct the jury that 
the female must have been shown to have in fact 
made an actual, physical, honest attempt to resist 
the defendant's advances . . . efforts concomitant 
with her ability and opportunities. State v. Roberts, 
91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584; State v. Christensen, 73 
Utah 575, 276 P. 163. The law obviously requires 
more than merely demonstrating th'at her conduct 
suggests she resisted in some degree. Instead it must 
be shown that the woman resented the attack made 
upon her in good faith and without pretense, with 
an active determination to prevent the violation upon 
her person: 
"Although some force be used, yet if she 
does not put forth all the power of resistance 
which she was capable of exerting under the 
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circumstances it will not be rape." Perez v. 
State, supra. 
In here heeding the instruction of the court, the 
jury n1ay easily have returned their verdict, guilty 
of rape, when in fact all that was shown to them 
beyond reasonable doubt was evidence sufficient for 
conviction of a battery. Kreiner v. United States, 11 
F. 2d 722, cert. den. 46 S. Ct. 639, 271 U. S. 688 
70 L. Ed. 1152. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK 
RECITING PARTICULARS AND DETAILS OF THE 
ALLEGED OFFENSE AS RELATED TO HER BY THE 
PROSECUTRIX WAS HEARSAY AND INADMISSIBLE, 
AND WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT. 
The State called Thelma Babcock, a close friend 
of the prosecutrix, as a witness. Mter stating that 
the prosecutrix had come to her trailer on the morn-
ing of June 15th, she said (T. 37): 
A. When she came to my trailer, or up 
to my apartment, I thought she had come up 
to tell me that she was going to work, but 
when I saw the expression on her face I knew 
something was badly wrong, and I ~asked her, 
I said: "Shirley, what is wrong?" 
Q. Did she respond? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did she say? 
A. She said: "Thelma, I'm in terrible 
trouble." She said: "Larry Horne entered my 
trailer last night, and raped me," was the 
very words she said. 
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It is well settled in this state that in a prosecu-
tion for rape, while it is competent to give testimony, 
as an exception to the hearsay rule, that the prose-
cutrix complained that someone had sexual inter-
course with her, forcibly 'and against her will, it 
is not competent to give testimony as to the name 
of the person or who it was that committed the out-
rage upon her: 
"We believe the conversation of the prose-
cutrix with a friend within hours after she 
had arrived home, as related by such friend, 
was so lacking in details that its admission 
did not violate the rule heretofore enunci'ated 
by this court to the effect that where a woman 
allegedly has been unlawfully violated sexu-
ally, any statement m'ade by her within a 
re'asonably short time thereafter, is admissible 
if, without recitation of the details, it refers 
to the commission of the offense, such state-
ment being a spontaneous utterance whose 
very spontaneity together with a character-
istic, natural feminine inclination to express 
an outraged feeling under such circumstances, 
guarantees its trustworthiness." State v. Mar-
tinez, 7 Utah 2d 387, 326 P. 2d 102. 
" ... (I) t is not competent to give testi-
mony as to the name of the person or who it 
was that committed the outrage upon her 
... " State v. Christensen, supra. See also: 
State v. Tellay, 100 Utah 25, 110 P. 2d 342; 
State v. Neel, 21 Utah 151, 60 P. 1510. 
Counsel's failure to m'ake timely objection to 
the question when propounded by the prosecutor 
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at the trial is not fatal to this assignment of error, 
nor does it bar the court from now considering the 
effect of her reply upon the rights of the defendant. 
People v. Holmes, 292 Mich. 212, 290 N.W. 384. The 
prosecutor knew his witness, and well understood 
what she would testify, and that her testimony could 
irrevocably prejudice the defendant in that it might 
be accepted by the jury to nearly the same extent 
as if she were testifying as an eye-witness to the 
alleged offense . . . irrevocably in that once her 
testimony was before the jury the harm was done, 
the error completed; motions and objections could 
not then repair the injury to the defendant. Know-
ing this, as the prosecutor surely must have, he 
framed his question in such a m'anner as to elicit 
specifically the answer he got: "Larry Horne en-
tered my trailer last night, and raped me." 
This court has well stated the sober responsi-
bility of a prosecutor: 
''Both the court and the prosecutor should 
be zealous in protecting the rights of an ac-
cused, and should carefully refrain from do-
ing or saying anything from which it might 
be inferred that an unfair advantage was 
taken of a defendant." State v. Jameson, 103 
Utah 129, 134 P. 2d 173. 
It is submitted th'at this duty, incumbant upon the 
prosecutor, was breached, in that he failed to make 
certain that the defendant, accused of such a crime, 
difficult at best to defend, was fully protected from 
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conviction by any means tainted with unfairness 
or prejudice. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant timely 'and properly moved for a new 
trial, (R. 27) which was denied by the court. (R. 29) 
The grant or refusal of a new trial generally 
rests in the sound discretion of the court. Such dis-
cretion, however, is not mere caprice, but the exer-
cise of a deliberate judgment, founded on well estab-
lished principles, having for its aim the promotion 
of justice and the protection of the innocent. When 
ruling on such a motion, it is incumbant upon the 
court to m'ake its determination upon the merits of 
the motion itself. State v. W ea'Ver, 78 Utah 555, 6 
P. 2d 167. Such discretion has been said to be per-
haps the greatest protection of the accused against 
the mistakes and prejudices of the jury. State v. 
Maloney, 115 La. 498, 39 So. 539. Where there is 
any doubt as to the duty to grant a new trial, it 
should be resolved in favor of the defendant. 23 
C.J.S. 1121, § 1422. The court is referred to each 
of the points hereinbefore alleged, as proper grounds 
in support of the defendant's motion. 
Where the prosecutor has been guilty of con-
duct calculated to arouse prejudice against the de-
fendant, and to prevent him from having a fair 
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trial, a conviction will be set aside and a new trial 
granted. Brasher v. State, 22 Ala. App. 79, 112 So. 
535; Neely v. State, 60 Okla. Cr. 99, 61 P. 2d 7 41; 
Hager v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 9, 133 P. 263. This is 
especially true where the improper conduct or the 
results thereof cannot be obvi'ated by timely objec-
tion and appropriate action as is here the case. 
Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 176 So. 86'2; State v. 
Mcintyre, 203 Iowa 451, 212 N.W. 757. 
The erroneous instructions of the court are also 
grounds for a new trial, in that they misled 'and 
misdirected the jury. Arnold v. United States, 94 
F. 2d 499. 
The motion should have been granted because 
of the insufficiency of the evidence, Fuson v. Com-
mon1vealth, 230 Ky. 761, 20 S.W. 2d 7 42, in that the 
Yerdict of the jury was clearly against the weight 
of the evidence, there being reasonable doubt as to 
the 'accused's guilt. People v. White, 85 Cal. App. 
241, 2'59 P. 76. 
The serious errors of the court and prosecutor; 
the lack of substantial evidence in support of the 
accusation against the defendant; the strong pre-
sumption of falsity of the prosecutrix' testimony; ... 
for these reasons it is submitted that the failure 
of the court to grant defendant's motion for a new 
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POINT VI. 
THAT THE ERRORS OF THE COURT WERE CU-
MULATIVE AND WHEN VIEWED IN C·ONNECTION 
WITH EACH OTHER RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO 
THE DEFENDANT. 
It is a fundamental rule that even though the 
errors of the court, if they were considered to be 
separate and isolated instances may not amount to 
the deprivation of a fair trial, if the various errors 
combine to reach that result, prejudice to the de-
fendant may be shown. State v. Moore, 111 Utah 
458, 183 P. 2d 973. This is especially so in a case 
of the nature of the instant action, as the court 
has recognized: 
"There are some criminlal offenses that 
by their inherent nature are so repulsive or 
even so abhorrent to most people that the 
mere accusation, unless accompanied by every 
precaution of law, creates a prejudice. Rape 
is among these." State v. Whittinghill, supra. 
It is submitted th~at the errors of the court and 
prosecutor as set forth heretofore do constitute pre-
judice to the defendant and did in fact deprive him 
of a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the conviction of this de-
fendant should be reversed in that the errors of thE 
court and prosecutor, and the lack of sufficient evi· 
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dence, resulted in a deprivation of a fair 'and im-
partial trial for the accused, and that the verdict 
of the jury was based upon bias, passion and pre-
judice, and not upon the evidence adduced at the 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CRAIG T. VINCENT 
822 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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